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PROCEDURE 
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Information Governance Measures to Prepare for the Upcoming Changes 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2014), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i2/article5.pdf. 
 
“[W]ithout a corresponding change in discovery culture by 
courts, counsel and clients alike, the proposed rules 
modifications will likely have little to no effect on the 
manner in which discovery is conducted today.”1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] It has been over seven years now since the so-called e-Discovery 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules,” 
                                                          
* Senior Discovery Counsel, Recommind, Inc.; J.D., Santa Clara University School of 
Law, 1999; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young University, 1994. 
 
1 Mitchell Dembin & Philip Favro, Changing Discovery Culture One Step at a Time, 
LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202630168239/Changing-Discovery-Culture-
One-Step-at-a-Time?slreturn=20140126202727 (describing the steps organizations can 
take to satisfy the provisions set forth in the newly proposed amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure).  
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“Rules,” or individually, “Rule”) went into effect.2  When they were 
implemented, various commentators reasoned those amendments would 
facilitate a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of discovery 
issues.3  This, in turn, would free parties to focus on the merits of claims 
and defenses, “teeing matters up for disposition through settlement, 
summary judgment, or trial.”4  The reality, of course, is far from this 
Pollyannaish vision.  Instead of simplifying the process, the 2006 
amendments seem to have generated more satellite litigation than ever 
before about preservation and production issues.5 
                                                          
2 See U.S. Supreme Court Order Amending the Fed. R. Civ. P. at 3,  Apr. 12, 2006, 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see also Philip 
J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining Metadata, 
13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18 n.114 (2007). 
 
3 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY 
OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 24 (Sep. 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf; see 
also Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens Associated 
with E-discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 
MERCER L. REV. 963, 964 (2008) (explaining that “the 2006 amendments are intended to 
help reduce the costs and burdens imposed by electronic discovery”). 
 
4 Philip J. Favro & Hon. Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for 
Proportionality under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 
979 (2012); see also Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies 
Not in Our Rules . . ., 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 142 (2011) (arguing that the 2006 Rules 
amendments “place a premium on a fair resolution on the merits” and deter lawyers from 
using discovery “as an opportunity to hide the ball until trial”). 
 
5 See Philip Favro & Tish Looper, The Rule 37(e) Safe Harbor: The Touchstone of 
Effective Information Management, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., December 2011, at 
12;  Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al.,  Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 792-95 (2010) (observing that the “highest number of filed 
motions and awards relating to e-[D]iscovery sanctions in any single year prior to 2010 
occurred in 2009, three years after the effective date of the 2006 amendments”). 
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[2] Beyond the issues spawned by the 2006 amendments, the costs and 
complexity of discovery are increasing due to digital age advances that 
have caused information to proliferate exponentially.6  For example, 
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablet computers have provided 
users with new methods that facilitate a more rapid and user-friendly 
exchange of information.7  Users now share that information with 
increasing frequency through short message service and social networks.8  
Because users do so in far greater quantities than they did with e-mail, the 
number of communications potentially subject to discovery has been 
substantially augmented.9  Moreover, users have an unlimited virtual 
                                                          
6 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., 113TH CONG., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 271 (Comm. Print 2013), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-
amendments.pdf [hereinafter REPORT] (observing that “[t]he amount and variety of 
digital information has expanded enormously in the last decade, and the costs and 
burdens of litigation holds have escalated as well”). 
 
7 See generally Tom Kaneshige, Infographic: BYOD’s Meteoric Rise, CIO (Jan. 16, 2013, 
2:50 PM), http://blogs.cio.com/consumer-it/17707/infographic-byods-meteoric-rise 
(noting the substantial growth of personal mobile device use in the workplace). 
 
8 See Gabriella Khorasanee, The Growing Reach of e-Discovery: Text Messages, IN-
HOUSE (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/in_house/2013/10/the-
growing-reach-of-e-discovery-text-messages.html (discussing survey results regarding 
cellphone use for text messaging, along with associated e-Discovery risks arising from 
text messaging). 
 
9 Cf. William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 487 (2013) 
(observing that discovery burdens have increased due to the “massive explosion of digital 
data,” which includes “e[-]mails, text messages, internal knowledge management 
platforms designed to replace e[-]mail, and digitized voice mail”).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 2 
 
 
4 
 
warehouse in which to store those conversations due to the popularity of 
low cost cloud computing services.10 
 
[3] Given these factors and the challenges they present to the 
discovery process, there should be little doubt as to why the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (“Committee”) has 
proposed another round of Rules amendments.11  The draft amendments 
are generally designed to streamline the federal discovery process, 
encourage cooperative advocacy among litigants, and eliminate 
gamesmanship.12  The proposed changes also tackle the continuing 
problems associated with the preservation of electronically stored 
information (“ESI”).13  As a result of its efforts, the Committee has 
produced a package of amendments that could affect many aspects of 
federal discovery practice.14 
 
                                                          
10 See generally William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 n.26, 1202-04 
(2010) (defining cloud computing and describing its rapidly expanding usage). 
 
11 See generally Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past The Debate: Proposed 
Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 187-90 
(2013) (describing generally the factors driving the demand for additional amendments to 
the Federal Rules); REPORT, supra note 6, at 259-339. 
 
12 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 260, 270. 
 
13 See id. at 272, 274. 
 
14 See Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 11, at 178-79.  See generally REPORT, supra note 6, 
at 259-339. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 2 
 
 
5 
 
[4] To date, most of the debate on the proposals has focused on the 
draft amendment to Rule 37(e).15  That amendment would raise the 
standard of culpability required to impose sanctions for any failure to 
preserve relevant information.16  Such attention is understandable given 
the proposal’s likely impact on organizations’ defensible deletion efforts.17  
Nevertheless, there are several other noteworthy changes that are no less 
important for litigants and lawyers.18  Among these are the amendments 
that would usher in a new era of adversarial cooperation, proportionality 
standards, and active judicial case management.19  The collective impact 
of these proposals could result in decreased burdens and costs for courts, 
clients, and counsel alike.20 
 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Rules Committee Adopts ‘Package’ of Discovery 
Amendments, 13 DIGITAL DISCOVERY AND E-EVIDENCE 200 (2013), 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X4ST0CC4000000 
 
16 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 272 (“[T]he amended rule [37(e)] makes it clear that—in 
all but very exceptional cases in which failure to preserve ‘irreparably deprived a party of 
any meaningful opportunity to present or defend against the claims in the litigation’—
sanctions (as opposed to curative measures) could be employed only if the court finds 
that the failure to preserve was willful or in bad faith, and that it caused substantial 
prejudice in the litigation.” (quoting the proposed Rule 37(e)(1)(B)(ii))). 
 
17 See Michael Kozubek, Proposed Federal Rule Changes Would Limit the Scope of e-
discovery, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/07/01/proposed-federal-rule-changes-would-limit-
the-scop. 
 
18 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260. 
 
19 See id. 
 
20 See Alison Frankel, Debate Sharpens on Proposed Changes to Federal Rules on 
Discovery, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2013/11/06/debate-sharpens-on-proposed-changes-to-federal-rules-on-discovery/. 
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[5] For organizations to meet the challenges these proposed changes 
pose, they will need to take actionable measures to satisfy those 
provisions.21  Such measures generally fall under the umbrella of an 
enterprise’s information governance plan.22  For many companies, 
information governance remains an elusive concept.23  Nevertheless, an 
intelligent information governance plan offers a more enlightened 
approach for companies to comply with the proposed Rules changes.24  
Moreover, it is perhaps the only way for clients to realistically reduce the 
costs and burdens of discovery.25 
 
[6] In this Article, I will consider these subjects. In Part II, I provide 
an overview of the newly proposed amendments and discuss the impact 
the Rules proposals will likely have on organizations. In Part III, I offer 
five practical suggestions that, if followed, will help enterprises meet the 
information governance challenges posed by the proposed Rules 
amendments. 
 
II.  THE NEWLY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
 
[7] The overall thrust of the Committee’s proposed amendments is to 
facilitate the tripartite aims of Federal Rule 1 in the discovery process.26 
                                                          
21  Cf. Hon. Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40 
LITIG. 6, 7 (2013) (urging lawyers to use “[twenty-first] century computer technology” to 
address digital age discovery issues instead of relying on legacy discovery technologies). 
 
22 See Dembin & Favro, supra note 1.  
 
23 See id. 
 
24 See id. 
 
25 See id. 
 
26 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260-61, 264, 269-70.  
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To carry out Rule 1’s lofty yet important mandate of securing “the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of litigation,27 the Committee has 
proposed several modifications to advance the notions of cooperation and 
proportionality.28  Other changes focus on improving “early and effective 
judicial case management.”29  In addition, the Committee has proposed 
revising Federal Rule 37(e) in an attempt to create a uniform national 
standard for discovery sanctions stemming from failures to preserve 
evidence.30  The draft amendments that address these concepts are each 
considered in turn. I will then conclude this Part by generally discussing 
the effects the Rules changes will likely have on organizations.  
 
A.  Cooperation—Rule 1 
 
[8] To better emphasize the need for adversarial cooperation in 
discovery, the Committee has recommended that Rule 1 be amended to 
specify that clients share the responsibility with the court for achieving the 
Rule’s objectives.31  The proposed revisions to the Rule (in italics with 
deletions in strikethrough) read in pertinent part as follows: “[These rules] 
should be construed, and administered, and employed by the court and the 
                                                          
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 
28 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260-61, 264, 269-70 (observing that “[p]roportionality in 
discovery, cooperation among lawyers, and early and active judicial case management 
are highly valued and, at times, missing in action,” and discussing how the proposed 
amendments would advance these notions). 
 
29 Id. at 260. 
 
30 See id. at 272 (“A central objective of the proposed new Rule 37(e) is to replace the 
disparate treatment of preservation/sanctions issues in different circuits by adopting a 
single standard.”). 
 
31 See id. at 270. 
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parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”32 
 
[9] Even though this concept was already set forth in the Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 1, the Committee felt that an express reference 
in the Rule itself would prompt litigants and their lawyers to engage in 
more cooperative conduct.33  Perhaps more importantly, this mandate 
should also enable judges “to elicit better cooperation when the lawyers 
and parties fall short.”34 Indeed, such a reference, when coupled with the 
“stop and think” certification requirement from Federal Rule 26(g), should 
give jurists more than enough procedural basis to remind counsel and 
clients of their duty to conduct discovery in a cooperative and cost 
effective manner.35 
 
B.  Proportionality—Rules 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36 
 
[10] The logical corollary to cooperation in discovery is 
proportionality.36  Proportionality standards, which require that the 
                                                          
32 Id. at 281. 
 
33 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 270, 281. 
 
34 Id. at 270. 
 
35 See Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., No. 11-cv-01606-PAB-CBS, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143251, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011) (spotlighting the 
importance of the Rule 26(g) certification requirement, along with sanctions for 
noncompliance, for curbing discovery abuses). 
 
36 See, e.g., Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116427, at *23-27 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(discussing generally why cooperation and proportionality are inextricably intertwined 
for purposes of discovery). 
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benefits of discovery be commensurate with its burdens, have been extant 
in the Federal Rules since 1983.37  Nevertheless, they have been invoked 
too infrequently over the past thirty years to address the problems of over-
discovery and gamesmanship that permeate the discovery process.38  In an 
effort to spotlight this “highly valued” yet “missing in action” doctrine,39 
the Committee has proposed numerous changes to the current Rules 
regime.40  The most significant changes are found in Rules 26(b)(1) and 
34(b).41 
 
1.  Rule 26(b)(1)—Tightening the Scope of Permissible 
Discovery 
 
[11] The Committee has proposed that the permissible scope of 
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) be modified to spotlight the limitations 
proportionality imposes on discovery.42  Those limitations are presently 
found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and are not readily apparent to many lawyers or 
judges.43  Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides that discovery must be limited where 
requests are unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, the discovery can be 
                                                          
37 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
 
38 Cf. Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966-968 (proposing modest changes to the Federal 
Rules to better emphasize that proportionality standards are the touchstone of federal 
discovery). 
 
39 REPORT, supra note 6, at 260. 
 
40 See id. at 264-67, 269. 
 
41  See id. at 264-67. 
 
42 See id. at 265, 296. 
 
43 See id. at 296; Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966. 
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obtained from an alternative source that is less expensive or burdensome, 
or the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its benefit.44  The 
proposed modification (in italics) would address this problem by placing 
them in Rule 26(b)(1) and by more clearly conditioning the permissible 
scope of discovery on proportionality standards: 
 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the 
amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at stake 
in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.45 
 
By moving the proportionality rule directly into the scope of discovery, 
counsel and the courts may gain a better understanding of the restraints 
this concept places on discovery.46 
 
[12] Rule 26(b)(1) has additionally been modified to enforce the notion 
that discovery is confined to those matters that are relevant to the claims 
or defenses at issue in a particular case.47  Even though discovery has been 
limited in this regard for many years, the Committee felt this limitation 
was being swallowed by the “reasonably calculated” provision in Rule 
                                                          
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 
45 REPORT, supra note 6, at 289. 
 
46 See Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966, 976. 
 
47 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 296-97. 
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26(b)(1).48  That provision currently provides for the discovery of relevant 
evidence that is inadmissible so long as it is “reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence.”49  Despite the narrow purpose of 
this provision, the Committee found many judges and lawyers unwittingly 
extrapolated the “reasonably calculated” wording to broaden discovery 
beyond the benchmark of relevance.50  To disabuse courts and counsel of 
this practice, the “reasonably calculated” phrase has been removed and 
replaced with the following sentence: “Information within this scope of 
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”51 
 
[13] Similarly, the Committee has recommended eliminating the 
provision in Rule 26(b)(1) which presently allows the court—on a 
showing of good cause—to order “discovery of any matter relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the action.”52  In its proposed “Committee 
Note,” the Committee justified this excision by reiterating its mantra about 
the proper scope of discovery: “Proportional discovery relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense suffices.”53  
 
                                                          
48 Id. at 266. 
 
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 
50 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 266. 
 
51 Id. at 289-90. 
 
52 Id. at 265-66, 296-97. 
 
53 Id. at 296-297. 
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2.  Rule 34(b)—Eliminating Gamesmanship with 
Document Productions 
 
[14] The three key modifications the Committee has proposed for Rule 
34 are designed to eliminate some of the gamesmanship associated with 
written discovery responses.54  The first change is a requirement in Rule 
34(b)(2)(B) that any objection made in response to a document request 
must be stated “with specificity.”55  This recommended change is 
supposed to do away with the assertion of general objections.56  While 
such objections have almost universally been rejected in federal discovery 
practice, they still appear in Rule 34 responses.57  By including an explicit 
requirement for specific objections and coupling it with the threat of 
sanctions for non-compliance under Rule 26(g), the Committee may 
finally eradicate this practice from discovery.58 
 
[15] The second change is calculated to address another longstanding 
discovery dodge: making a party’s response “subject to” a particular set of 
objections.59  Whether those objections are specific or general, the 
Committee concluded that such a conditional response leaves the party 
who requested the materials unsure as to whether anything was withheld 
and, if so, on what grounds.60  To remedy this practice, the Committee 
                                                          
54  See id. at 269. 
 
55 REPORT, supra note 6, at 269, 307-08. 
 
56 See id. at 308. 
 
57 See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008). 
 
58 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 
59 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 269. 
 
60 See id. at 269, 309. 
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added the following provision to Rule 34(b)(2)(C): “An objection must 
state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of 
that objection.”61  If enforced, such a requirement could make Rule 34 
responses more straightforward and less evasive.62  This, in turn, would 
obviate needless meet-and-confer efforts and motion practice undertaken 
to ferret out such information.63 
 
[16] The third change is intended to clarify the uncertainty surrounding 
the responding party’s timeframe for producing documents.64  As it now 
stands, Rule 34 does not expressly mandate when the responding party 
must complete its production of documents.65  That omission has led to 
delayed and open-ended productions, which can lengthen the discovery 
process and increase litigation expenses.66  To correct this oversight, the 
Committee proposed that the responding party complete its production “no 
later than the time for inspection stated in the request or [at] a later 
reasonable time stated in the response.”67  For so-called “rolling 
productions,” the responding party “should specify the beginning and end 
dates of the production.”68  Such a provision should ultimately provide 
                                                          
61 Id. at 308. 
 
62 See id.  at 269, 309. 
 
63 See id.  
 
64 See REPORT, supra note 6 at 269. 
 
65 See id.  
 
66 See id. 
 
67 Id. at 269, 307. 
 
68 Id. at 269, 309. 
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greater clarity and increased understanding surrounding productions of 
ESI.69 
3.  Other Changes—Cost Shifting in Rule 26(c), 
Reductions in Discovery under Rules 30, 31, 33, 36 
 
[17] There were several additional changes the Committee 
recommended that are grounded in the concept of proportionality.  The 
new cost shifting provision in Rule 26(c) is particularly noteworthy.70  
While several courts have implied cost-shifting authority presently exists 
in Rule 26(c) and have issued orders accordingly, the proposed changes 
would eliminate any ambiguity on this issue.71  Courts would be expressly 
authorized to allocate the expenses of discovery among the parties.72 
 
[18] The Committee has also suggested reductions in the number of 
depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission.73  Under the draft 
amendments, the number of depositions would be reduced from ten to 
five.74  Oral deposition time would also be cut from seven hours to six.75  
As for written discovery, the number of interrogatories would decrease 
from twenty-five to fifteen and a numerical limit of twenty-five would be 
                                                          
69 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 269. 
 
70 See generally id. at 266, 298. 
 
71 See id. 
 
72 See id. 
 
73  See id. at 267-69. 
 
74 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 267. 
 
75 Id. at 301. 
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introduced for requests for admission.76  That limit of twenty-five, 
however, would not apply to requests that seek to ascertain the 
genuineness of a particular document.77 
 
C.  Case Management—Rules 4, 16, 26, 34 
 
[19] To better ensure that its objectives regarding cooperation and 
proportionality are achieved, the Committee has introduced several Rules 
changes that would augment the level of judicial involvement in case 
management.78  Most of these changes are designed to improve the 
effectiveness of the Rule 26(f) discovery conference, to encourage courts 
to provide input on key discovery issues at the outset of a case, and to 
expedite the commencement of discovery.79 
 
1.  Rules 26 and 34—Improving the Effectiveness of the 
Rule 26(f) Discovery Conference 
 
[20] One way the Committee felt it could enable greater judicial 
involvement in case management was to require the parties to flesh out 
specific issues in the Rule 26(f) conference.80   The renewed emphasis on 
conducting a meaningful Rule 26(f) conference is significant as courts 
                                                          
76 See id. at 268-69, 305. 
 
77 See id. at 269. 
 
78 See id. at 260-61. 
 
79 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 261. 
80 See id. at 263. 
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generally believe that a successful conference is the lynchpin for 
conducting discovery in a proportional manner.81 
 
[21] To enhance the usefulness of the conference, the Committee 
recommended amending Rule 26(f) to specifically require the parties to 
discuss any pertinent issues surrounding the preservation of ESI.82  This 
provision is calculated to get the parties thinking proactively about 
preservation problems that could arise later in discovery.83  It is also 
designed to work in conjunction with the proposed amendments to Rule 
16(b)(3) and Rule 37(e).84  Changes to the former would expressly 
empower the court to issue a scheduling order addressing ESI preservation 
issues.85  Under the latter, the extent to which preservation issues were 
addressed at a discovery conference or in a scheduling order could very 
well affect any subsequent motion for sanctions for failure to preserve 
relevant ESI.86 
 
[22] Another amendment to Rule 26(f) would require the parties to 
discuss the need for a “clawback” order under Federal Rule of Evidence 
                                                          
81 See, e.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE 
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, at princ. 2.05-2.06 (2010), 
available at http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Principles8_10.pdf. 
 
82 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 295. 
 
83 See id. at 299. 
 
84 See id. at 263; accord id. at  287. 
 
85 See id. at 263. 
 
86 See id. at 299, 327-28. 
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502.87  Though underused, Rule 502(d) orders generally reduce the 
expense and hassle of litigating over the inadvertent disclosure of ESI 
protected by the lawyer-client privilege.88  To ensure this overlooked 
provision receives attention from litigants, the Committee has drafted a 
corresponding amendment to Rule 16(b)(3) that would specifically enable 
the court to address Rule 502(d) matters in a scheduling order.89 
 
[23] The final step the Committee has proposed for increasing the 
effectiveness of the Rule 26(f) conference is to amend Rule 26(d) and 
Rule 34(b)(2) to enable parties to serve Rule 34 document requests prior to 
that conference.90  These “early” requests, which are not deemed served 
until the conference, are designed to “facilitate the conference by allowing 
consideration of actual requests, providing a focus for specific 
discussion.”91 This, the Committee hopes, will enable the parties to 
subsequently prepare Rule 34 requests that are more targeted and 
proportional to the issues in play.92 
 
                                                          
87 See REPORT, supra note 6 at 263, 296. 
88 See John M. Barkett, Evidence Rule 502: The Solution to the Privilege-Protection 
Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1589, 1619-20 (2013) (discussing the 
importance of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) in reducing the costs and burdens 
associated with attorney-client privilege reviews in discovery).  See generally Richard 
Marcus, The Rulemakers’ Laments, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1639 (2013) (describing the 
underuse of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 502(d)). 
 
89 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 286. 
90 See id. at 263-64, 294, 298, 306, 308. 
91 Id. at 263-64. 
92 See id. at 264. 
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2.  Rule 16—Greater Judicial Input on Key Discovery 
Issues 
 
[24] As mentioned above, the Committee has suggested adding 
provisions to Rule 16(b)(3) that track those in Rule 26(f) so as to provide 
the opportunity for greater judicial input on certain e-Discovery issues at 
the outset of a case.93  In addition to these changes, Rule 16(b)(3) would 
also allow a court to require that the parties caucus with the court before 
filing a discovery motion.94  The purpose of this provision is to encourage 
the disposition of these matters without the expense or delay of motion 
practice.95  According to the Committee, various courts have used similar 
arrangements under their local rules that have “prove[n] highly effective in 
reducing cost and delay.”96 
 
3.  Rules 4 and 16—Expediting the Commencement of 
Discovery 
 
[25] The Committee has also recommended the time for the 
commencement of discovery be shortened after the filing of the complaint 
so as to expedite the eventual disposition of a given case.97  In particular, 
Rule 4(m) would be revised to shorten time to serve the summons and 
complaint from 120 days to sixty days.98  In addition, the Rule 16(b)(2) 
                                                          
93 See id. at 263. 
 
94 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 288. 
 
95 See id. at 263, 288. 
 
96 Id. at 263. 
 
97 See id. at 261, 282, 284-85, 287 
 
98 Id. at 261, 282. 
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amendment would reduce by thirty days the time when a court must issue 
a scheduling order.99 
 
D.  Preservation and Sanctions under a Revised Federal Rule 
37(e) 
 
[26] The Committee has separately considered issues regarding the 
over-preservation of evidence and the appropriate standard of culpability 
required to impose sanctions for any failures to preserve relevant 
information.100  Even though the current iteration of Rule 37(e) is 
supposed to provide guidance on these issues, amendments were deemed 
necessary given the inherent limitations with the Rule.101 
 
[27] As it now stands, Rule 37(e) is designed to protect litigants from 
court sanctions when the good faith, programmed operation of their 
computer systems automatically destroys ESI.102  Nevertheless, the Rule 
has largely proved ineffective as a national standard because it does not 
apply to pre-litigation information destruction activities.103  As a result, 
courts often used their inherent authority to bypass the Rule’s protections 
and punish clients that negligently, though not nefariously, destroyed 
                                                          
99 REPORT, supra note 6, at 261, 284-85. 
 
100 See id. at 271-72. 
 
101 See id. at 272, 274. 
 
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  See generally Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has 
the Rule 37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Information Management?, 11 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 317 (2010) (discussing the background, purposes, and 
application of Rule 37(e)). 
 
103 See Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation 
Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 398 (2008). 
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documents before a lawsuit was filed.104  Moreover, the Rule applied only 
to ESI and did not address issues surrounding the preservation of paper 
documents or other forms of evidence.105  All of which has caused 
confusion among parties over what needs to be maintained for litigation, 
resulting in the over-preservation of information.106 
 
[28] The amendments to Rule 37(e) are designed to address these issues 
by “provid[ing] a uniform standard in federal court for sanctions for 
failure to preserve.”107  They do so by removing the possibility that courts 
could impose the so-called doomsday sanctions from Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for 
either negligent or grossly negligent conduct in connection with 
preservation obligations.108  Instead, the proposal would shield pre-
litigation destruction of information from sanctions except where “the 
party’s actions” resulted in either of the following: “(i) caused substantial 
prejudice in the litigation and were willful or in bad faith; or (ii) 
irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to present or 
defend against the claims in the litigation.”109 
 
                                                          
104 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that the proposed amendments reject a 
standard that holds negligence to be sufficient for sanctions, such as the one used in 
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
 
105 See id.  at 274. 
 
106 See id. at 317-18. 
 
107 Id. at 321; see id. at 318. 
 
108 See id. at 272, 321. 
 
109 REPORT, supra note 6, at 315.  
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[29] In making a determination on this issue, courts would no longer 
just rely on their inherent powers.110  Instead, they would employ a 
multifaceted analysis to examine the nature and motives underlying the 
party’s information retention decisions.111  Such factors include: 
 
(A) the extent to which the party was on notice that 
litigation was likely and that the information would be 
discoverable; 
(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the 
information; 
(C) whether the party received a request to preserve 
information, whether the request was clear and reasonable, 
and whether the person who made it and the party 
consulted in good faith about the scope of preservation; 
(D) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any 
anticipated or ongoing litigation; and 
(E) whether the party timely sought the court’s guidance on 
any unresolved disputes about preserving discoverable 
information.112 
 
[30] By ensuring the analysis includes a broad range of considerations, 
the proposed Rule appears to delineate a balanced approach to 
preservation questions.113  Such an approach may very well benefit 
organizations, which could justify a reasonable document retention 
                                                          
110 See id. at 320. 
 
111 See id. at 325-28. 
 
112 Id. at 316-17. 
 
113 See id. at 325-28. 
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strategy on best corporate practices for defensible deletion.114  The 
Committee contemplates as much, observing that “[t]his subdivision 
[proposed Rule 37 (e)(1)(B)(i)] protects a party that has made reasonable 
preservation decisions in light of the factors identified in Rule 37(e)(2), 
which emphasize both reasonableness and proportionality.”115 
 
[31] While the draft amendments to Rule 37(e) provide some key 
protections for enterprises, the proposed Rule also addresses some of the 
lingering concerns from the plaintiffs’ bar.116  For example, the Rule 
specifically empowers the court to order “additional discovery” or other 
“curative measures” when a litigant has destroyed information that it 
should have retained for litigation.117 Under these provisions, an aggrieved 
party can ferret out the circumstances surrounding the destruction of that 
data.118  If the party uncovers evidence suggesting the destruction was 
sufficiently grievous, it could ultimately justify the imposition of sanctions 
under either of the above tests.119 
 
E.  The Instant Rules Proposals Will Impact Organizations 
 
[32] To be sure, the amendments the Committee has proposed will have 
a direct impact on organizations.  For example, the draft revisions to Rule 
37(e) clearly emphasize the need for companies to develop reasonable 
                                                          
114 Kozubek, supra note 17.  
 
115 REPORT, supra note 6, at 321. 
  
116 See id. at 314-15, 320-21. 
 
117 Id. at 314-15. 
 
118 See id. at 320-21. 
 
119 See id. at 320-23, 325-28. 
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information retention policies, along with a workable litigation hold 
procedure.120  The enterprise that does so could simultaneously eliminate 
large amounts of information and reduce its discovery costs and legal 
exposure.121 
 
[33] Another effect of the proposed changes is that they will force 
companies to address discovery matters on an expedited timeframe.122  
The truncated time periods for the service of a complaint and the issuance 
of a scheduling order mean parties would have less time to prepare for the 
commencement of discovery.123 
 
[34] In addition, the proposals spotlight the need for litigants to be 
prepared to address substantive discovery issues early in the case.  This is 
evidenced by the draft requirement that litigants discuss ESI preservation 
and Rule 502(d) orders at the Rule 26(f) conference and the Rule 16(b) 
scheduling conference.124  The proposed advent of early Rule 34 
document requests is also exemplary of this substantive discovery issue as 
it would require litigants to more thoroughly vet discovery issues at the 
                                                          
120 Cf. Dembin & Favro, supra note 1 (suggesting some steps that in-house lawyers can 
take on behalf of their organizational clients to change the manner in which discovery is 
conducted). 
 
121 See id.; see also supra Part II.D. 
 
122 REPORT, supra note 6, at 261 (“The case-management proposals reflect a perception 
that the early stages of litigation often take far too long. ‘Time is money.’ The longer it 
takes to litigate an action, the more it costs. And delay is itself undesirable.”). 
 
123 See supra Part II.C.3. 
 
124 See supra Part II.C.1-2. 
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Rule 26(f) conference.125  The elimination of open-ended, rolling 
document productions under a revised Rule 34(b)(2)(B) also underscores 
the need for better discovery preparations and expedited compliance.126 
 
[35] The proportionality changes to Rule 26(b)(1) will also impact 
organizations.127  Companies seeking to stave off overly broad requests 
will need to better understand the nature of their relevant data if they are to 
articulate with the necessary precision the burdens associated with 
production.128  Otherwise, disproportionate production orders will 
continue to be issued.129  In contrast, companies that have a grasp of their 
relevant information stand a greater chance of making the case to narrow 
the scope of the requests or having the costs of discovery shifted under the 
proposed amendment to Rule 26(c).130 
 
[36] In summary, there should be little dispute that the proposed 
amendments will affect litigants.  The question for organizations, 
                                                          
125 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 
126 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 
127 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 
128 See generally Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116427, at *23-27 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (discussing proportionality standards). 
 
129 See id. 
 
130 See supra Part II.B.3.  See generally Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-
4168 (MLC), 2012 US. Dist. LEXIS 52885 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (invoking 
proportionality standards to deny substantially all of the plaintiff’s document requests). 
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however, is whether they will take the necessary measures to improve 
their information governance so they are prepared for the Rules changes 
once they are enacted. 
 
III.  PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR MEETING THE INFORMATION 
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES POSED BY THE DRAFT RULES CHANGES 
 
[37] If enterprises expect to address the likely effects of the proposed 
Rules amendments, they will need to take proactive steps to ensure they 
can do so.131  While there are no quick or easy solutions to these problems, 
an increasingly popular method for effectively dealing with them is 
through an organizational strategy referred to as information 
governance.132  At its core, information governance is a comprehensive 
approach that companies adopt to satisfy the challenges associated with 
information retention, data security, privacy, and e-Discovery.133  
Organizations that have done so have been successful in addressing the 
costs and risks associated with these formerly distinct disciplines.134 
 
                                                          
131 See Charles R. Ragan, Information Governance: It’s a Duty and It’s Smart Business, 
19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, ¶ 9 (2013), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i4/article12.pdf; Dean 
Gonsowski, Inside Experts: Information Governance Takes the Stage in 2012, INSIDE 
COUNSEL (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/27/inside-experts-
information-governance-takes-the-st. 
 
132 See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶¶30-33. 
 
133 See Gonsowski, supra note 131. 
 
134 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09cv58, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45888, at *46-48 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2011) (holding that sanctions were 
not appropriate where emails were eliminated pursuant to a good faith information 
retention policy before a duty to preserve attached). 
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[38] While there are many steps that enterprises can take to implement 
an effective information governance program, the five that I discuss in this 
Part are essential for those companies seeking to satisfy the draft Rules 
changes and thereby decrease the costs and delays associated with the 
discovery process.  They include developing reasonable information 
retention policies; preparing an effective litigation hold process; creating 
policies governing employee mobile device use; deploying technologies 
for ESI collection, search, and review; and developing a more coordinated 
and better managed relationship with outside counsel.  I consider each of 
these steps in turn. 
 
A.  Develop Reasonable Information Retention Policies 
 
[39] If a company is really intent on obtaining more cost-effective 
results in discovery under the proposed Rules, it should examine its 
strategy for information retention.135  The time to conduct this 
examination is not in the crisis atmosphere of complex litigation.136  
Instead, it should be part of the business plan for the organization.137  
Effective information retention requires each business unit to identify the 
records that it creates, why it creates them, whether to retain them and for 
how long, who gets access to these records, and where the records are 
stored.138  The organization that can easily determine whether relevant 
                                                          
135 See Anne Kershaw, Proposed New Federal Civil Rules—Part One (Data Disposition 
& Sanctions), EXCHANGE (ARMA Metro NYC, New York, N.Y.), Nov.–Dec. 2013, at 
10, 13, http://www.armanyc.org/files/Nov-Dec%202013%20FINAL.pdf (opining that 
“organizations will have every reason to make sure that they routinely dispose of 
documents that do not need to be retained” if the proposed changes to Rule 37(e) are 
enacted). 
 
136 See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶¶ 42-43. 
 
137 See id. 
 
138 See id. 
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records exist and where they should be located will clearly be ahead when 
litigation inevitably arises.139 
 
[40] This, in turn, should lead to the development of top-down 
information retention policies.140  Enterprises can hardly hope to decrease 
their discovery spending if their retention policies are antiquated, 
inadequate, or arbitrarily observed.141  Indeed, the casebooks are replete 
with examples of companies whose discovery costs skyrocketed because 
they failed to properly manage their data with reasonable retention 
protocols.142  The case of Northington v. H&M International is 
particularly instructive on this issue.143 
 
[41] In Northington, the court issued an adverse inference instruction to 
address the defendant company’s destruction of key e-mails and other 
ESI.144  The company failed to preserve those records because it did not 
                                                          
139 See Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572-73 (D. Utah 2012) 
(denying plaintiffs’ fourth motion for doomsday sanctions since evidence was destroyed 
pursuant to defendants’ “good faith business procedures”). 
 
140 See Gonsowski, supra note 131. 
 
141 See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007) (denying 
defendants’ request to invoke the so-called “safe harbor” provision under Rule 37(e) 
where the defendants failed to observe their own document retention policies). 
 
142 See, e.g., United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 274 (2007) 
(sanctioning defendant for allowing materials to be destroyed by its “antiquated” 
retention policies); Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 378. 
 
143 Northington v. H&M Int’l, No. 08-CV-6297, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14366, at *43, 
*45-46 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011). 
 
144 Id. at *58-61. 
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think to implement a pre-litigation information retention strategy.145  For 
example, the company neglected to establish a formal document retention 
policy.146  Instead, “data retention . . . was evidently handled on an ad hoc, 
case-by-case basis.”147  This lack of organization eventually led to the loss 
of key data, costly motion practice, and the court’s sanctions award.148 
 
[42] To avoid these negative consequences, companies should insist 
that their in-house counsel work with IT professionals, records managers, 
and business units to jointly decide what data must be kept and for what 
length of time.149  By so doing, companies can spearhead the development 
of retention policies that are reasonable in relation to the enterprise’s 
business needs and its litigation profile.150  This should eventually lead to 
the systematic elimination of useless, superfluous, and/or harmful data in 
an organized and reasonable fashion.151  If performed in this manner, it is 
unlikely that such document destruction would be viewed as spoliation 
under the draft revisions to Rule 37(e) or much of the existing case law on 
this issue.152 
                                                          
145 See id. at *22-25. 
 
146 Id. at *21. 
 
147 Id. 
 
148 Northington, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14366, at *16-19, *21. 
 
149 See Gonsowski, supra note 131. 
 
150 See id. 
 
151 See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(approving information retention policies that eliminate documents for “good 
housekeeping” purposes); Gonsowski, supra note 131. 
 
152 See, e.g., Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10 C 761, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7850, at 
*8, *10-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)) (denying sanctions 
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B.  Prepare an Effective Litigation Hold Process 
 
[43] If information retention policies are to be effective for purposes of 
the draft revisions to Rule 37(e), they must be accompanied by a workable 
litigation hold process.153  Without a workable approach to litigation 
holds, the entire discovery process may very well collapse.154  For 
documents to be produced in litigation, they must first be preserved.155  
Documents cannot be preserved if the key players or data source 
custodians are unaware that they must be retained.156  Indeed, employees 
and data sources may discard or overwrite ESI if they are oblivious to a 
preservation duty.157  This would leave organizations vulnerable to data 
loss and court sanctions, regardless of the proposed changes to Rule 
37(e).158  No recent case is more instructive on this than E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours v. Kolon Industries.159 
                                                                                                                                                
motion since the emails at issue were eliminated pursuant to a good faith retention policy 
before a duty to preserve was triggered).  
 
153 See, e.g., id. at *8-10, *12-13 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)). 
 
154 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
509-10 (E.D. Va. 2011) (issuing an adverse inference jury instruction as a result of the 
defendant’s failure to distribute a timely and comprehensive litigation hold after its 
obligation ripened to retain relevant ESI). 
 
155 See, e.g., id. at 508-09. 
 
156 See, e.g., id. at 507-09. 
 
157 See Oleksy v. General Elec. Co., No. 06 C 1245, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107638, at 
*33-35 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2013) (ordering the production of defendant’s litigation hold 
instructions as a discovery sanction for failing to preserve relevant evidence that was 
purged from a database). 
 
158 See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 316, 327 (D. Del. 2013) 
(declaring defendant’s patents unenforceable as a discovery sanction to address its failure 
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[44] In Du Pont, the court issued a stiff rebuke against defendant Kolon 
Industries for failing to issue a timely and proper litigation hold.160  That 
rebuke came in the form of an instruction to the jury that Kolon executives 
and employees deleted key evidence after the company’s preservation 
duty was triggered.161  The jury responded by returning a $919 million 
verdict in favor of DuPont.162 
 
[45] The destruction at issue occurred when Kolon deleted e-mails and 
other records relevant to DuPont’s trade secret claims.163  After being 
apprised of the lawsuit and then receiving multiple litigation hold notices, 
various Kolon executives and employees met together and identified ESI 
that should be deleted.164  The ensuing data destruction was staggering: 
                                                                                                                                                
to preserve email backup tapes, paper documents and other ESI).  But see Brigham 
Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572-73 (D. Utah 2012) (denying plaintiffs’ 
fourth motion for doomsday sanctions since evidence was destroyed pursuant to 
defendants’ “good faith business procedures”). 
 
159 See Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 510. 
 
160 Id. at 501-02, 509-10. 
 
161 Id. at 509-10. 
 
162 E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 721 (E.D. 
Va. 2012) (entering a 20-year product injunction against the defendant); Press Release, 
McGuire Woods, Jury Returns $919 Million for DuPont in Trade Secrets Theft Case 
(Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://mcguirewoods.com/News/Press-
Releases/2011/9/Jury-Returns-$919-Million-for-DuPont-in-Trade-Secrets-Theft-
Case.aspx. 
 
163 Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 478-82. 
 
164 Id. at 478, 480-82, 501-05. 
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nearly 18,000 files and e-mails were destroyed.165  Furthermore, many of 
these materials went right to the heart of DuPont’s claim that key aspects 
of its Kevlar formula were allegedly misappropriated to improve Kolon’s 
competing product line.166 
 
[46] Surprisingly, however, the court did not blame Kolon’s employees 
as the principal culprits for spoliation.167  Instead, the court criticized the 
company’s attorneys and executives, reasoning they could have prevented 
the destruction of information through an effective litigation hold 
process.168  This was because the three hold notices circulated to the key 
players and data sources were either too limited in their distribution, 
ineffective since they were prepared in English for Korean-speaking 
employees, or were too late to prevent or otherwise alleviate the 
spoliation.169 
 
[47] The Du Pont case underscores the importance of developing a 
workable litigation hold process as part of the company’s overall 
information governance plan.170  As Du Pont teaches, organizations 
should identify what key players and data sources may have relevant 
information.171  Designated officials who are responsible for preparing the 
                                                          
165 Id. at 480. 
 
166 Id. at 480, 482, 489. 
 
167 Id. at 501. 
 
168 Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (holding that Kolon’s “counsel and executives should 
have affirmatively monitored compliance with the [litigation hold] orders.”). 
 
169 Id. at 479, 494. 
 
170 See generally id. 
 
171 See id. at 500. 
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hold should then draft the hold instructions in an intelligible fashion.172  
Finally, the hold should be circulated immediately to prevent data loss.173  
It is only by following these suggestions that organizations can ensure that 
information subject to a preservation duty is actually retained and thereby 
avoid sanctions under the proposed amendments to Rule 37(e).174 
 
C.  Create Policies Governing Mobile Device Use 
 
[48] Another aspect of information governance that can help companies 
address the impact of the Rules proposals is the development of policies 
governing the use of mobile devices.175  These devices—especially 
smartphones and tablet computers—are at the forefront of digital age 
innovations affecting businesses today.176  While these mobile devices 
                                                          
172 See id. 
 
173 See Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 500. 
 
174 See, e.g., Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10 C 761, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7850, at 
*12-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B)) (denying sanctions 
motion since defendant issued a timely litigation hold to preserve relevant documents 
once a preservation duty attached). 
 
175 See PHILIP BERKOWITZ ET AL., LITTLER REPORT, THE “BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE” TO 
WORK MOVEMENT: ENGINEERING PRACTICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 
COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS 1, 45 (2012), available at 
http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/TheLittlerReport-
TheBringYourOwnDeviceToWorkMovement.pdf (detailing legal challenges regarding 
mobile device use such as implementing legal holds, protecting trade secrets, and proving 
misappropriation). 
 
176 See Greg Day, Overview from Greg Day On the Topic of Bring Your Own Device—
The Challenges Facing Today and How This Trend Will Evolve in the Future, SYMANTEC 
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.symantec.com/tv/news/details.jsp?vid=1555866669001 
(describing the various challenges associated with mobile devices in the workplace).  
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have revolutionized the way in which business is conducted, they have 
also introduced a myriad of security, privacy, and e-Discovery 
complications for enterprises.177 
 
[49] In particular, mobile device use lessens the extent of corporate 
control over confidential business information.178  Whether that 
information consists of trade secrets, proprietary financial data, or 
attorney-client privileged communications, mobile devices allow 
employees to more easily disclose and misappropriate that information 
than they otherwise could have with traditional computer hardware.179  
With a single touch of a smartphone screen, an employee can direct 
sensitive company data to personal cloud providers, social networking 
sites, or Wikileaks pages.180  Any of these scenarios could prove 
disastrous for an organization.181   
                                                          
177 See BERKOWITZ, supra note 175, at 10. 
 
178 See Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, BYOD:  Know the Privacy and 
Security Issues Before Inviting Employee-Owned Devices to the Party, ACC DOCKET, 
Apr. 2012, at 71, 72, available at http://www.ficlaw.com/Links/raether/Rir_byod.pdf 
(“Security starts with knowing what data resides where, and who has access to that data.  
With employee-owned devices, the main unique issue from a security perspective is loss 
of control.”). 
 
179 See id. 
 
180  See Lisa Milam-Perez, Littler Mendelson Attorney Warns of Pitfalls of “BYOD”, 
WOLTERS KLUWER (July 29, 2012), 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/07/29/littler-mendelson-attorney-
warns-of-pitfalls-of-byod/ (describing best practices for workplace policies regarding 
mobile device use: “No use by friends and family members!  ‘I got the most guff for this 
one . . . and I imagine you probably will too.  I know your kid likes to play Angry Birds, 
and I know you bought it with your own money,’ but it’s an essential control”); Privacy 
Roundtable Highlights, RECORDER (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202591017099 (discussing the risk of 
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[50] Furthermore, an enterprise has the challenge of preserving and 
producing information maintained on a mobile device.182  The logistical 
challenges of locating, retaining, and turning over that data—all while 
trying to observe employee privacy—present complications for satisfying 
the proposed Rules amendments, among many other things.183 
 
[51] To address these and other problems associated with these devices, 
organizations will need to develop workable use policies.184  Such policies 
will need to address how employees should handle company data on 
mobile devices, regardless of whether those devices are work-issued or 
whether they belong to the employee.185  They should also delineate the 
nature and extent of the enterprise’s right to access data on the employee 
                                                                                                                                                
misappropriation of company data by family members sharing devices that may also be 
used for work under an employer’s mobile device policy). 
 
181 See Milam-Perez, supra note 180 (discussing the “potential liability and other risks” 
of bring your own device policies). 
 
182 See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶ 16 (noting that companies must keep certain 
information for various time periods and the effect of new technologies on information 
retention). 
 
183 See id; see also Greg Buckles, A Quick Forensics Lesson: The Smart Phone Is Much 
More Than Just a Hard Drive, LEGAL IT PROFS. (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/legal-it-columns/guest-columns/4471-a-quick-
forensics-lesson-the-smart-phone-is-much-more-than-just-a-hard-drive (describing 
various challenges surrounding the preservation and collection of ESI from mobile 
devices). 
 
184 See Susan Ross, Unintended Consequences of Bring Your Own Device, LAW TECH. 
NEWS, Mar. 7, 2013, at 3, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202591156823&th
epage=1. 
 
185 See Milam-Perez, supra note 180; Privacy Roundtable Highlights, supra note 180. 
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device, particularly for discovery purposes.186  To address inevitable 
privacy concerns that arise when trolling through an employee device for 
discoverable data, technologies could be downloaded on to that device to 
segregate and encrypt company information from personal materials.187  
Such a measure would also help prevent an employee’s family or friends 
from accessing confidential ESI.188 
 
[52] Another best practice for enabling more rapid preservation and 
production of mobile device ESI is to eliminate any notion that the 
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device.189  While 
this can likely be done by policy for work-issued devices, it should 
probably be secured by separate agreement from an employee who is 
using a personal device under a “bring your own device” policy.190  The 
organization that has an unfettered right to obtain relevant ESI from a 
mobile device will more likely satisfy the preservation, proportionality, 
and accelerated compliance expectations of the proposed Rules 
amendments.191 
                                                          
186 See Day, supra note 176. 
 
187 See Philip J. Favro, Inviting Scrutiny: How Technologies are Eroding the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 158 (2013), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article2.pdf. 
 
188 Id. 
 
189 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 323, 341 (2012). 
 
190 See id. at 341, 362-63. 
 
191 See generally Howard Hunter, Social Media and Discovery, 24 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N  
INT'L L. PRACTICUM 117, 117, 119-21 (2011) (describing the interplay between privacy 
strictures and discovery obligations).  
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D.  Deploy Technologies for ESI Collection, Search, and 
Review 
 
[53] Just as technology can facilitate compliance with company mobile 
device policies, ESI collection, search, and review technologies can help 
companies satisfy the expedited discovery objectives of the Rules 
proposals.192  This undoubtedly includes cutting edge innovations such as 
predictive coding and visualization tools.193 
 
[54] Predictive coding employs machine-learning technology to more 
readily pinpoint relevant ESI than would be possible for human 
reviewers.194  If properly utilized, predictive coding can also reduce the 
staff required to conduct document reviews.195  On the other hand, 
visualization tools use analytics and machine learning to provide 
companies with a better understanding of the nature of their relevant 
information.196  This allows for the detection of trends, relationships, and 
                                                          
192 See Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40 NO. 1 
LITIG. 6, 6-7 (2013). 
 
193 See id. at 7 (“A better method for searching large databases is predictive coding.”).  
 
194 See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing the 
cost and review benefits that predictive coding technologies may offer over traditional 
review methods). 
 
195 See id. 
 
196 Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of 
the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 4, 9 n.27 (2003) (discussing the functions and ostensible benefits of visualization 
technologies). 
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patterns within the universe of that information; all of which can expedite 
the search and review process.197 
 
[55] Enterprises would also be well served to familiarize themselves 
with traditional e-Discovery technology tools such as keyword search, 
concept search, email threading, and data clustering.198  With respect to 
keyword searches, there is significant confusion regarding their continued 
viability given some prominent court opinions frowning on so-called blind 
keyword searches.199  However, most e-Discovery jurisprudence and 
authoritative commentators confirm the effectiveness of certain keyword 
searches so far as they involve some combination of testing, sampling and 
iterative feedback.200   
                                                          
197 See Jacob Tingen, Technologies-That-Must-Not-Be-Named: Understanding and 
Implementing Advanced Search Technologies in E-Discovery, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 
¶¶ 1-2, 43 (2012), http://jolt.richmond.edu/index.php/407/ (explaining the benefits of 
using visualization tools in discovery over traditional review methods). 
 
198 See Philip Favro, Mission Impossible? The eDiscovery Implications of the ABA’s New 
Ethics Rules, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-
discovery-blog/2012/08/30/mission-impossible-the-ediscovery-implications-of-the-abas-
new-ethics-rules/ (describing the importance of using traditional and new technologies to 
satisfy discovery obligations). 
 
199 See, e.g., Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 190-91; William A. Gross Const. Assocs, Inc. v. Am. 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This case is just the latest 
example of lawyers designing keyword searches in the dark, by the seat of the pants, 
without adequate (indeed, here, apparently without any) discussion with those who wrote 
the emails.”). 
 
200 See William A. Gross, 256 F.R.D. at 135-36; Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, 
Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260-62 (D. Md. 2008) (“Selection of the appropriate search and 
information retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by persons qualified to 
design effective search methodology.  The implementation of the methodology selected 
should be tested for quality assurance; and the party selecting the methodology must be 
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[56] Regardless of the tools that a litigant selects for collection, search, 
and review, some form of technology is ultimately necessary to meet the 
proposed Rules changes.  It is not difficult to envision the problems that 
companies will have litigating under the revised Rules without using some 
combination of these tools.201  For example, enterprises will find it 
difficult to intelligently discuss discovery matters at the Rule 26(f) 
conference or the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference.  Nor will they be able 
to establish—much less meet—good faith production deadlines required 
by proposed Rule 34(b)(2)(B).  While various other scenarios similar to 
these abound, it is sufficient to observe that e-Discovery in 2014 and 
beyond will require help from technology.202 
 
E.  Better Management of Outside Counsel 
 
[57] A final measure that companies should consider is developing a 
more carefully managed relationship with their retained outside counsel.203  
More of an outgrowth of information governance, such a well-managed 
relationship has the potential to keep client discovery costs more 
                                                                                                                                                
prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is 
appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented.”). 
 
201 See Walsh, supra note 192, at 7 (“The biggest problem I see with electronic discovery 
is that lawyers are using 20th-century technology-that is, obtaining all of the documents, 
organizing them in folders, and trying to read and digest them-to address 21st-century 
production.”).  
 
202 See id. 
 
203 See Shawn Cheadle and Philip J. Favro, Push or Pull: Deciding How Much Oversight 
is Required of In-house Counsel in eDiscovery, ACC DOCKET, May 2013, at 82, 89 
(describing some of the ways that in-house counsel can obtain better advocacy from its 
retained outside counsel). 
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reasonable while guiding counsel to litigate within the bounds of the 
proposed Rules changes.204 
 
[58] The first step that companies can take in this regard is to state their 
expectations for how discovery should be conducted at the time of 
retention or at the commencement of a suit.205  A realistic budget and 
staffing, considering those expectations, must be addressed.206  Companies 
should also emphasize to their engaged lawyers the importance of 
satisfying the requirements of the proposed Rules, particularly 
proportionality standards.207  While these requirements may be overlooked 
or even unknown to many attorneys, clients are bound—under penalty of 
sanctions—to ensure that their discovery efforts meet these standards.208  
Moreover, company efforts to insist on proportional discovery may be 
rewarded with decreased preservation and collection costs.209 
 
[59] It is also crucial that organizations communicate with their outside 
lawyers regarding pertinent aspects of their information governance 
                                                          
204 See id. at 89-90. 
 
205 Id. at 89. 
 
206 Id. 
 
207 Id. 
 
208 Cheadle & Favro, supra note 203, at 89; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 
209 See generally Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 52887 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 
0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116427 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 
F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 2 
 
 
40 
 
plan.210  To decrease the possibility for misunderstandings, companies 
should provide ready access to appropriate information technology 
personnel and relevant business leaders (the owners of the relevant 
information) to outside counsel.211  Outside counsel cannot be effective—
and may inadvertently stumble into a costly e-Discovery sideshow—if 
they are unfamiliar with the company’s information governance and 
retention policies.212  In contrast, having such information will enable 
outside counsel to more easily negotiate key issues surrounding the 
discovery of ESI at the Rule 26(f) conference and Rule 16(b) scheduling 
conference.213  Moreover, open communication regarding this matter will 
facilitate strategy and logistics regarding the preservation and collection of 
relevant information.214 
 
[60] By taking these steps, organizations will increase their likelihood 
of compliance with the Rules proposals.  In addition, having such an 
organized strategy and partnership will reduce discovery delays and 
related legal fees that typically result from poor planning.215 
 
 
                                                          
210 See Kershaw, supra note 135, at 13 (noting that “lawyers will need to have a good 
understanding of their client’s records management and disposition policies”). 
 
211 See id. 
 
212 See id. at 11, 13. 
 
213 See id. at 13 (“[E]ngaging in early discussions with adversaries  . . . means we can 
finally replace preservation uncertainty—the reason why organizations save everything—
with preservation certainty.”). 
 
214 See id. 
 
215 See Gonsowski, supra note 131. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
[61] Compliance with the proposed Rules amendments does not need to 
be an elusive concept.  Organizations can prepare for the Rules 
amendments by taking the initiative to implement or update their 
information governance strategy.  By following the suggestions that I 
delineate in this Article, along with other best practices, enterprises can 
satisfy the new requirements under the draft Rules revisions.  In so doing, 
they will likely reduce the costs and burdens associated with discovery—
both now and in the future. 
 
 
